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developed their genocidal methods, inventing
and refining the techniques oftransportation,
selection and gassing, and the schemes of
subterfuge used to hide these atrocities from
relatives and potential pockets ofopposition.
To demonstrate the "intimate connections"
between these two programmes, Friedlander
chronicles the various stages in the Nazi
campaigns against their most helpless victims,
children and the mentally ill, whose tragic
stories he sensitively narrates. He also spends
considerable time on the identities,
backgrounds and motivations ofthe
perpetrators, often pointing out generational,
social and psychological similarities. His
attempt to deal with both sets ofatrocities in
the same framework is admirable, as is the
attention Friedlander gives to relatively
neglected groups, such as "Gypsies" and, in
particular, "handicapped" Jews. He
impressively incorporates a wealth ofprimary
research into a tight and cogently argued study.
However, Friedlander's central thesis
imposes limitations on the material and at
times seems overstated. Unlike Michael
Burleigh, whose outstanding book on German
"euthanasia" appeared one year earlier,
Friedlander shows little interest in the
economic roots ofNazi medical policy or in
the pre-history ofeuthanasia in the Weimar era
psychiatric reform movement. Determined to
point out the connections between euthanasia
and genocide, he offers too narrow an account
ofthe origins ofthe "final solution". That the
path to Auschwitz was "twisted" and was
reached by trial and error-as Karl Schleunes
so convincingly demonstrated-seems to
contradict Friedlander's claims, which ignore
such causative considerations as the impact of
the war on Nazi racial policy or the strength of
anti-Semitic sentiment in the German
population.
Finally, the book is plagued by an even more
significant problem. Friedlander argues against
the notion of "medicalized killing", repeatedly
insisting that the murderous campaigns had
little to do with medicine, and that doctors'
constant presence at gassings was merely
incidental. That the physicians who staffed the
killing centres had medical degrees is, he
asserts, "quite beside the point" (p. 219).
Moreover, he sets out to show that Nazi
eugenics "lacked a true scientific basis" and
represented "scientific fraud" (p. 126). With
statements like these, Friedlander seems to
miss one ofthe essential points ofthis story.
Indeed, as shown by Robert Proctor in 1989
and by many others subsequently, Nazi
programmes against racial minorities and the
disabled represented not a vulgar politicization
ofscience, but rather the realization ofideas
furthered by many ofthe leading scientists of
the period.
Friedlander himselfasks near the end ofthe
book why doctors were always present at these
killings, but he finds no satisfactory answer,
other than claiming that this was Hitler's wish
and their presence facilitated bureaucratic
aspects ofthe procedure. But the fact that it
was doctors who ordered and carried out the
murder oftens ofthousands ofdisabled
Germans seems to be far more than incidental
and should be the starting point for a critical
engagement with this period and its legacy.
Ultimately, as an argument about technical
aspects ofNazi atrocities, Friedlander's book is
well-researched, cogent and informative. Yet,
in his complete dismissal ofthe idea of
"medicalized killing", he ignores the
biologization that characterized German
society and politics in this period and thus fails
to address the issues that historians ofscience
and medicine, and many students ofGerman
history, will find most interesting and urgent.
Paul Lerner, Wellcome Institute
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The deluge ofSchreber scholarship shows
no signs ofabating. After being psychiatrized,
psychoanalysed, historicized, Lacanized and
antipsychiatrized, Daniel Paul Schreber's role
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as one ofthe longest running serial paradigm
cases in history continues.
From Eric Santner's My own Germany, he
re-emerges as emblematic ofthe crisis that
marked the passage to modernity, and that led
to National Socialism. In Santner's words, "The
series ofcrises precipitating Schreber's
breakdown ... were largely the same crises of
modernity for which the Nazis would elaborate
their own series ofradical and ostensibly 'final'
solution. I am, in a word, convinced that
Schreber's breakdown and efforts at self-
healing introduced him into the deepest
structural layers ofthe historical impasses and
conflicts that would provisionally culminate in
the Nazi catastrophe" (p. xi). No small claim.
Schreber's symptoms are re-diagnosed as signs
ofa wider socio-historical crisis in the
individual's relation to authority, which Santner
dubs symbolic investiture. Schreber's Memoirs
are re-figured as an attempt to answer the
question, "What remains ofvirility at the end of
the nineteenth and beginning ofthe twentieth
century?" (p. 9). Not only does Santner invoke
this to provide a new interpretation of
Schreber's breakdown, but also ofthe historical
transition to modernity: "The social and
political stability of a society as well as the
psychological 'health' ofits members would
appear to be correlated to the efficacy ofthese
symbolic operations-to what we might call
theirperfiormative magic-whereby individuals
'become who they are,' . . . We cross the
threshold ofmodernity when the attenuation of
these performatively effectuated social bonds
becomes chronic, when they are no longer
capable ofseizing the subject in his or her self-
understanding ... It is, I think, only by way of
understanding the nature ofthis unexpected,
historical form ofanxiety that one has a chance
ofunderstanding the libidinal economy of
Nazism, and perhaps ofmodern and
postmodern forms oftotalitarian rule more
generally" (p. xii). From his humble beginnings
as a case history, Schreber has become the
avatar ofmodemity, and postmodernity.
The major shortcoming of Santner's book is
that the supposedly pervasive crisis of
symbolic investiture that is invoked to explain
Schreber's breakdown is nowhere adequately
mapped or substantiated. The exemplarity
accorded to texts by Franz Kafka, Walter
Benjamin and others stands in for the more
detailed historical reconstruction that would be
required to make sense of such claims. Indeed,
Santner's arguments are unlikely to carry any
conviction unless one shares his commitment
to a post-structural version ofpsychoanalysis-
a Freud retooled by Lacan, Zizek et al. As is
typical of such literature, theoretical
reworkings do not extend to Freudian articles
offaith: Freud, it is again said, "founded
psychoanalysis to a large extent on the basis of
his own self-analysis" (p. 19). Ultimately, it is
such precommitments that preclude a historical
comprehension ofFreud's reading of Schreber,
the development ofpsychoanalysis, and its role
in forming the modern.
Sonu Shamdasani, Wellcome Institute
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Are the thoughts offamous and influential
academics important because they emanate
from the famous and influential? Or does one
become a famous and influential academic by
having important thoughts? As the famous and
influential philosopher, Hans-Georg Gadamer,
Emeritus Professor ofPhilosophy at the
University ofHeidelberg, would no doubt
appreciate, the pair ofquestions that opens this
review reprises a famous question that Socrates
once put to Euthyphro. In his influential work
Wahrheit undMethode (1960, translated as
Truth and method, 1975) Gadamer argued that
the positivistic methodologies ofempirical
social science can never fully comprehend
human culture because the long historical
horizon along which culture is transmitted
exceeds the grasp ofmethodologies rooted in
the present. Thus we today are still influenced
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